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In some very important ways, the task of writing a chapter on queer methodologies is 
doomed to failure; the two words of my title are reluctant bedfellows.  Methodologies 
are logics that attempt the impossible task of arranging different ways of knowing into 
hierarchical orders, based on competing ethical, practical and epistemological 
values.  While ‘queer’ is sometimes used as a supplementary term to ‘lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, and transgender,’ or as an overarching category that includes them all (and 
sometimes others), it is the understanding of ‘queer’ as an anti-essentialist counter-
disciplinary project, committed to partiality and irony, that concerns me most here.  
Queer strives to trouble Enlightenment projects, including the fiction that the field of 
study known as ‘methodology’ is rational and coherent.  As such ‘queer 
methodologies’ might be contradictions in terms; the first term insists on pluralism, 
heterogeneity, and understandings of difference that the second term writes off as 
error variance.  Nor is it clear if a chapter on queer methodologies will review those 
that exist, or consider what queer methodologies of the future might be.  When 
placed before ‘methodology’ is queer an adjective, a verb, or both?    
 
This chapter can only be a partial account of these tensions, and it will be informed 
by my involvement in the fields of social psychology and the history of psychology in 
particular.  My focus is going to be on that ‘workhorse of social psychological 
research, the experimental method’ (Aronson, Wilson & Brewer, 1998: 100).  Coming 
from LGBTQ psychology, experiments might seem like an odd place to site a queer 
project.  Kitzinger (1997; Kitzinger & Coyle, 2002) describe social constructionist and 
‘traditional’ epistemologies (including experiments) in lesbian and gay psychology as 
engaged in politically related but epistemologically dissonant projects.  Social 
constructionists critique the heteronormative, androcentric, imperialist edifice of 
psychology, while traditionalists use psychology’s fact-producing methods in the 
service of securing civil rights and other benefits for lesbians and gay men.  
Quantitative methods are often described as useful to lesbian and gay psychology as 
means of debunking homophobic myths and ‘bad science’ (e.g., Herek, 1998) while 
qualitative methods are described as means of enacting more collaborative, and less 
hierarchical relationships with research subjects (e.g., Coyle, 2000).  Through careful 
and insightful readings of both homophobic and gay-affirmative quantitative research 
in psychology, Noam Warner (2004) reaches the conclusion that queer 
methodologies in psychology are necessarily qualitative methods.  From these 
accounts, you could easily get the impression that political efficiency is the primary, if 
not the only, reason that savvy researchers would pick experiments out of the 
master’s toolkit to work with.   
 
This chapter gambles on the idea that such an understanding of quantitative methods 
forgets much about the ways that these methods have been practiced in the past, 
and encodes a limited imagination of what they might do in the future.  I am going to 
“celebrate the diversity” of the queer weeds that grow in the cracks of laboratory 
knowledge which positivist narratives rarely cherish and social constructionist 
quantophobia neglects to nurture.  This chapter is not an argument against 
qualitative methods. Throughout, its logic will be transparently indebted to thinking 
from the qualitative social sciences.  Rather, it is an attempt to historicize 
experiments by animating the queer voices in the ‘stubborn particulars’ of social 
psychology (Cherry, 1995) and to use those conversations across time to push past 
the heteronormative and non-reflexive horizons that ‘methodologies’ so often create.   
 
EXPERIMENTAL AND QUEER SUBCULTURES   
Psychology laboratories and queer sub-cultures have mutually defining histories.  
The professions of psychology and psychiatry expanded rapidly in the years after 
World War II, peopled often by veterans who received generous financial aid for 
university educations through the GI Bill (Capshew, 1999; Herman, 1995).1  In the 
post war US, psychology laboratories multiplied with generous contract support from 
funding agencies (Darley, 1952), and appeared to some to afford a Positivist vision of 
an experimental science of social relations (see e.g., Allport, 1954).  President 
Eisenhower described the Cold War as a psychological battle for the hearts and 
minds of Americans, making the psychology loyalty of individuals a matter of national 
security (see Lutz, 1997).  However, gay men and lesbians were on the wrong side of 
this state sponsored war.  Homosexuality was grounds for exclusion from military 
service for the first time in World War II. A range of ad hoc biological, psychiatric and 
psychological techniques were piloted as ways of detecting true homosexuals from 
heterosexual men who were feared to be ‘malingering’ as homosexual to escape 
active service (Berube, 1990).  Servicemen dismissed from the army with 
‘dishonorable discharges’ for homosexuality were barred from the GI bill that would 
have allowed them access to scientific training.  Gay men and lesbians were further 
excluded from government work under a series of executive orders signed in the 
early 1950s which barred them from an ever widening range of government 
positions. Ultimately the FBI collaborated with local police forces to ensure that there 
were no ‘sexual psychopaths’ in government employment (see Terry, 1999).  ‘Sexual 
psychopath’ laws were passed by over twenty states by the mid-1950s (Freedman, 
1987; Miller, 2002).   Enforcement of the military ban on homosexuality intensified 
after the war (Berube, 1990).  Some psychologists even tried to develop 
experimental technologies by which gay men could be detected and excluded from 
intelligence services (Gentile & Kinsman, 2000).   Popular fiction and social science 
writing conflated lesbianism with dangerous criminality, warning women of the 
consequences of nonconformity to increasingly restrictive heterosexual roles (Kunzel, 
2002; Freedman, 1996).   
 
This ‘sex panic’ (Rubin, 1984) created a climate of extreme suspicion a propos of 
research on homosexuality in the emerging human, cognitive, behavioural and 
psychological sciences, which curtailed the kinds of knowledge that experimental 
researchers in these various disciplines could construct.  In light of Kinsey’s findings 
about the sexual practices of American women, the Reece Commission put pressure 
on the Rockerfeller Foundation to withdraw their support for his Institute of Sex 
Research.  Kinsey died, a broken and exhausted man only a few years later 
(Gathorne-Hardy, 1998; Jones, 1997).  Evelyn Hooker, whose experimental work 
debunked much of the earlier wartime work on the ‘homosexual personality’ was 
scrutinized by her funders to make sure that she was not a lesbian (Hooker, 1993).  
Astronomer Frank Kameny lost his job in a government laboratory and later became 
an activist who spearheaded the move to have homosexuality removed from the 
DSM2 (Marcus, 1992).  This is not to say that lesbian and gay experimenters did not 
exist. Many gay professionals participated in underground networks such as those 
described by ‘Dr. Anonymous’ at the first meeting of the American Psychiatric 
Association in which openly gay and lesbian people spoke for themselves (Bayer, 
1981).  Roger Brown’s sexuality appears to have been an open secret (see Brown, 
1989).   Daryl Bem told his wife Sandra that he was more attracted to men than to 
women on their first date in the mid 1960s, but the couple went on to lecture publicly 
about how to have an egalitarian heterosexual marriage in the early 1970s (Bem, 
1998).    
 In short, the closet was a card of entry into the experimental cultures of social 
psychology that developed in post WWII America.  The gay and lesbian subcultures 
that developed at this time ultimately gave rise to ‘queer theory’ (Minton, 1997), but 
were deliberately expunged from the laboratories and university classrooms where 
psychology’s expert discourse and methodological norms were taking shape.  In 
spite of this, curious similarities between the two can be noted; in both spaces people 
play dress up, explore new identities, and push past the received wisdom of what ‘the 
social’ might become (Hegarty, 2001).  However, queer sub-cultures are not invested 
with authority as science is; some gender performances appear as ‘play acting’ while 
the artifice of social psychological experiments is understood to be exploring the 
reality of human sociality.  Small wonder that these two sub-cultures often reach 
radically different epistemological conclusions about how gender might be known 
(e.g., Parlee, 1996).   
  
Perhaps the most notorious social psychology experiment from this period is Stanley 
Milgram’s experiment on obedience.  Ostensibly unrelated to queer theory at all, I 
would like to argue that this experiment was compromised in its design and 
interpretation by Cold War sex panic.  Most of us who have been indoctrinated by the 
received wisdom in social psychology know the story; Milgram’s participants believed 
that they were following an experimenter’s orders by administering painful, and 
ultimately lethal, electric shocks to strangers as part of an experiment on learning.  
Participants delivered the electric shocks beyond the point where the ‘learner’ 
(actually a confederate) complained about his heart condition, banged on the wall, 
begged to be released from the experimental apparatus, and ultimately fell silent.  
Many psychologists found Milgram’s experiments unbelievable, replicated his 
procedures, and observed similar results in their own laboratories (see Milgram, 
1974).   
 
The received wisdom in the field is that Milgram’s experiment evidences how 
obedience to authority can lead ordinary individuals to engage in surprising evil 
actions, and thus provides a potent explanation of ordinary Germans’ participation in 
the Holocaust (e.g., Bauman, 1989; Brown, 1986; Hogg & Vaughn, 2005).   This 
interpretation of the experiment has been critiqued within psychology in two principle 
ways. First Baumrind raised the question of the experiment’s use of deception.  
Wasn’t that harmful to both individual participants and the public image of science?   
A second concern was raised by the possibility that the participants knew the true 
purpose of the experiment, such that their behaviour in the laboratory was little more 
than assent to the experimenter’s demand, and the experiment itself was 
epistemologically void (see also Orne, 1962).  In other words, while some critics 
thought the experiment too realistic, and others thought it was not realistic enough.  
 
Both of these critiques of the canonical reading of Milgram’s experiment take on new 
meanings when we keep in mind the concerns of queer subjects that his own 
experimental subculture disavowed.   First consider the Milgram experiment as an 
analogue of the Holocaust.  Queer people who are particularly vulnerable to state-
sponsored violence (including that of the Nazis) have a particular stake in the 
production of this critical knowledge.  However, in the narratives of the Holocaust to 
which Milgram’s work refers, the persecution of gay men and lesbians is never 
explicitly mentioned.  Indeed, in the early 1960s when Milgram’s work was published, 
any such claims would have been controversial.  The German law anti-sodomy law, 
Paragraph 175, had, since 1872, banned ‘unnatural fornication.’  In 1935 the Nazis 
re-wrote this law to categorize sodomy as a felony subject to imprisonment, affording 
the arrest of homosexuals who were sent to the camps.  After the war, Paragraph 
175 was deemed not to be one of the Nazi laws that contravened democratic 
principles, and which the Allied Control Council were empowered to overturn.  
Remembering the lesbian and gay victims of the Holocaust would have required 
Milgram to query the sex laws of Western democracies, both at home and abroad.  
He failed to theorize the relevance of his experiment to those laws.   
 
Next consider the claim that the participant in the experiment simply agrees to the 
experimenter’s ‘demands’ and knows that the situation is so extreme that it cannot 
possibly be real.  The ‘cover story’ for the Milgram experiment trades on the 
existence of, and public familiarity with, behaviourist psychology; the participant 
arrives at the laboratory armed with the knowledge that psychologists deliver electric 
shocks to people to make them learn new things.  Not only was this believable in the 
early 1960s, but some of Milgram’s participants may have been aware that such 
procedures were used to try to make gay and lesbian people ‘learn’ heterosexual 
responses.  Reparative therapy uses electric shocks, delivered in response to 
arousal to homoerotic stimuli to make gay/lesbian people ‘learn’ to be straight.1  
Along with electroshock, castration, clitorectomy, lobotomy, and arduous 
psychoanalysis it was part of the psychiatric arsenal used to extinguish 
homosexuality from American selves during the time of Milgram’s experiments (Katz, 
1976).   
 
Similar procedures were used in UK psychiatry from the 1950s until the 1980s.  
Some psychologists who practiced this work believed that they were helping 
unfortunate homosexuals to become better people.  Others knew from the start that 
reparative therapy would be a failed project.  Still others remind us of the shared 
history that queers have with Milgram when they recall that they were just obeying 
authority;  
 
Well I didn’t have much choice.  That was a clinical placement.  I was [the 
consultant’s] first student.  Basically the first year I was there, more or less all I ever 
did was shove electricity down homosexual patients (cited in King, Smith & Bartlett, 
2004)    
 
Thus, while Milgram’s work was well-positioned to comment on the criminalization 
and pathologization of lesbians and gay men, and may even have depended on that 
pathologization for the coherence of its cover story, widespread state-sponsored 
wars of gay men and lesbians fell beyond the domain of evil deeds to which Milgram 
generalized his work.  
 
Finally, consider Baumrind’s critique that the Milgram experiment is unethical for its 
use of deception methodologies, a criticism that Milgram countered by citing a follow-
up questionnaire of participants showing that virtually all were unharmed by the 
experience, and supported the continuation of the experiment.   Social psychology 
laboratories were not the only closed spaces in which people played with pain, 
obedience and power in the post war era.  During this period, autonomous SM 
cultures also developed in North America (Sisson, 2005).  In Milgram’s writings the 
existence of SM provides a background hypothesis which is refuted in favour of his 
claim that evil in the service of authority is a capacity of ordinary people;  
 
In the minds of some critics, there is an image of man (sic) that simply does not admit 
of the type of behaviour observed in the experiment.  Ordinary people, they assert, do 
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 As one mental health nurse recalled it “We had to become electrifying geniuses!  The 
situation was you had the screen, the person sat at the table wit hthe things [equipment] on 
and with a lever that they had to pull to avoid the shocks.  The pictures started off with pretty 
men, working their way through ugly men into ugly women and into pretty women.  That was 
the whole process literally.” (cited in Kind, Smith, and Bartlett, 2004, p. 3).   
not administer painful shocks to a protesting individual simply because they are 
ordered to do so.  Only Nazis and sadists perform this way.  In the preceding 
chapters, I have tried to explain why the behaviour observed in the laboratory comes 
about: how the individual makes an initial set of commitments to the authority, how 
the meaning of the action is transformed by the context in which it occurs, and how 
binding factors prevent the person from disobeying (Milgram, 1974:169, emphasis 
added)   
 
Milgram here contributes to a long history of conflating the psychological motivations 
of SM practices with Nazi violence (see also Moore, 2005). For Milgram, both are 
exceptional, and different in kind from the evil actions of the ordinary people who find 
their way into Milgram’s experiment.   Yet, very similar social psychology experiments 
were later referenced in debates among feminists about SM.  Linden, in the 
introduction to Against sadomasochism: A radical feminist analysis, described the 
experience of sadists and masochists as akin to that of the prisoners and guards in 
Zimbardo’s famous prison experiment;  
 
We can speculate that the experience of submission in a sadomasochistic 
relationship is far more intense than it was in the prison simulation.  Just as the 
“guards” made an easy accommodation to wielding power, we can expect that sadists 
who regularly practice dominant roles would become habituated to sadism, perhaps 
failing to comprehend its extremity (Linden, 1982: 8-9).  
 
Yet, contrary to Linden’s and Milgram’s suggestion, the practice of sadists in SM 
cultures might have provided Zimbardo and Milgram with methodological resources 
to engage differently with the ethically dubious practices of deception experiments.3  
Here, I’m referring to the practice of using agreed-upon signals, such as safety 
words, that provide the M to limit the scope of SM play and so to enter into that play 
more fully: 
 
As we progress toward the heavier action, it might be well to point out again that a 
true leather scene is not merely an exchange where one guy binds the other and 
whips the shit out of him.  There are a few M’s who want this; most don’t.  For this 
reason it is always important that the M be given an “out.”  In a situation, for example, 
where the M is gagged and blindfolded – rendered almost incapable of expression – it 
is still essential he be able to let the Topman know when he’s had enough.  It may 
only be case of needing to take a break, or it may require a complete shift in the type 
of action.  Regardless, if the S is worth his salt he will have made some provision for 
this.  It is much less disruptive of the role-situation for the S to say: “When you can’t 
take any more, do such-and-such” than for the M to set the signal (Townsend, 2000: 
131) 
 
Indeed, in his account of this experiment, Philip Zimbardo (1999) admits that he did 
become habituated to the guards’ cruelty and was caught in the double role of chief 
prison guard and experiment.  Had Milgram and Zimbardo found common kinship 
with such practices as the use of safety words in SM practices their experiments 
might have created still bolder knowledge about the ethics of consent in situations 
structured by obedience, power, and role-playing.  Rather, these experiments were 
structured and maintained by the fact that there was nothing that the participants 
could have said to the experimenters that would have stopped the experiments in 
their tracks.   
 
As it is, social psychologists have not solved the dilemma of how to do experiments 
without deception (Sieber, Iannuzzo & Rodriguez, 1995), it remains an ordinary 
practice in their laboratories, and one that has costs for researchers as well as 
participants (see Oliansky, 1991).  In spite of these obvious problems in experimental 
culture, there is a failure to look at the kinds of practical knowledge developed in 
queer sites, such as SM subcultures, for ways of pushing beyond these dilemmas 
about consent, freedom, power, and coercion.   
 
HOW DO YOU IDENTIFY? 
My discussion of the Milgram experiment presumes that there are multiple ways of 
writing about, and of remembering, what happens in experimental situations, and that 
queer methodologies might be practiced through close simultaneous attention to the 
implicit sexual politics involved in both concrete methodological practices and the 
general claims about human psychology that experiments warrant.  The reporting of 
experiments is highly codified, most obviously but the Publication Manual of the 
American Psychological Association (1994).  Eager to distance itself from 
psychology’s troubling homophobic past, the manual urges that ‘people who are not 
heterosexual’ should be described in published works as follows;  
 
The terms lesbians and gay men are preferable to homosexual when referring to 
specific groups.  Lesbian and gay refer primarily to identities and to the culture and 
communities that have developed among people who share those identities.  
Furthermore, homosexuality has been associated in the past with negative 
stereotypes. . . . The clearest way to refer inclusively to people whose orientatin is not 
heterosexual is to write lesbians, gay men,  and bisexual women or men – although 
somewhat long, the phrase is accurate (American Psychological Association, 1994: 
67). 
 
This shift from medicalized terms to community-derived terms attempts to effect a 
break with the stereotypes of the past.  Yet, as Walsh-Bowers (1999) has noted, the 
genre of writing proscribed by the Publication Manual also proscribes particular ways 
of seeing the world.  For example, by subdividing the ‘method’ section, into a quite 
cursory ‘participants’ section, and more lengthy ‘materials’ and ‘procedure’ sections, 
the Publication Manual treats people as inert resources, much like the materials that 
appear in natural science laboratories.2  Yet, as Walsh-Bowers (1999) notes there is 
nothing value-neutral about a natural science model of understanding that positions 
research participants as objects of knowledge, separate and distant from the 
psychologists who study them.  By miming the forms of writing that have long been 
practiced in the natural sciences, the Publication Manual not only proscribes writing 
within a genre, but also denies that that genre is a genre.  Since its inception in the 
17th century, the scientific journal article has been promoted as a means of  reporting 
‘matters of fact’ that avoids “meddling with Divinity, metaphysics, Morals, Politics, 
grammar, Rhetorick, or Logicks” (Hooke, 1663, cited in Bernal, 1965: 455).  As such 
it is one of the literary mediums through which scientists circulate an image of their 
activities operating in what Traweek (1988) calls a ‘culture of no culture.’  
 
Are there possibilities of queer knowledge that are suppressed by the codification of 
‘lesbians, gay men and bisexual women or men’ as the accurate way or referring to 
‘people who are not heterosexual’?  This question recalls Judith Butler’s (1993) claim 
about identification that “to write or speak as a lesbian appears a paradoxical 
appearance of this “I,” one which feels neither true nor false.  For it is a production, 
usually in response to a request” (p.307).  Butler elabourates;  
 
I’m not at ease with “lesbian theories, gay theories,” . . . identity categories tend to be 
instruments of regulatory regimes, whether as the normalizing categories of 
oppressive structures or as the rallying points for a liberatory contestation of that very 
oppression.  This is not to say that I will not appear at political occasions under the 
                                                 
2
 Here, it is worth remembering that the term ‘subject’ long used for participants in psychology 
experiments is derived from French pathologists term for a corpse, see Danziger (1990).   
sign of lesbian, but that I would like to have it permanently unclear what precisely that 
sign signifies (Butler, 1993: 308). 
 
It is this opaqueness of identity categories that the Publication Manual works to 
render transparent through prescriptions of a single accurate way to describe ‘people 
who are not heterosexual.’  Yet some of the best research on sexual identity is done 
in antithesis to this, as in Diamond’s (2006) or Rust’s (2000) research on sexual 
minority women who do not identify with any label at all.  In other contexts the 
explosion of possible terms for sexual minority identities points out the limits of the 
publication manual’s proscriptions.  SIGMA Research’s 2004 gay men’s sex survey is 
one of several annual surveys conducted ‘to collect a limited amount of information 
from a substantial number of men’ (Weatherburn, Reid, Hickson, Hammond & 
Stevens, 2004: 2).4   More than 32, 216 self-report questionnaires were distributed to 
113 HIV health promotion agencies in England, Wales and Scotland.   The survey 
was also posted on-line in English and Spanish.  Of the 19,210 surveys returned, 
3,208 were excluded.   Most exclusions occured because the respondents were not 
resident in the UK, but 383 men were excluded because there was neither ‘evidence 
of sex with men in the previous year or … gay, bisexual, or queer identity’ 
(Weatherburn et al., 2004: 4).  
 
In making this determination about identity, the researchers relied on the men’s own 
words.  These were occasioned by an open-ended questionnaire item; “What term do 
you usually use to describe yourself sexually?”  While most respondents identified as 
gay (n = 13,030) or bisexual (n = 1961) in response to this question, 893 specified 
that they usually did not use a term.  However, these terms failed to exhaust the 
diversity of identities that men used to describe themselves: 
 
 Of the 92 men (0.6%) who ticked other and remained in the sample, 18  
identified as ‘queer’ and one as ‘queer as fuck.’  Eight identified as homosexual 
alongside one who considered himself a ‘homosexualist.’  Five men identified as ‘bi-
curious.’  Another five were ‘curious’ including one that was ‘curious, not hetero and 
not gay’ and one that was ‘still curious.’  Five men identified as ‘open minded’, one 
simply ‘open’ and one ‘open to offers’.  Two identified as ‘confused’ including one that 
was ‘confused and experimenting’.  Four men identified as ‘straight’ and three as 
‘heterosexual’ or ‘hetero’.  Two men identified as transgendered and three as 
transsexual (two male-to-female and one unspecified). One man identified as a 
‘transvestite’.  One man each said: ‘anything – whatever you want I got it; ‘batty boy’; 
batty’; ‘bent’; ‘bloke who likes having sex with men’; discreet’ (sic); ‘dilemma’; 
‘experimental’; ‘free-spirited’; ‘goth’; happy’; ‘I am me – no pigeon holes’; ‘I like both, 
but very picky’; ‘lad who only fancies lads’; ‘non-heterosexual’; ‘not sure’; ‘man who 
has sex with men’; proficient’; ‘raving old poof’; ‘sexually active’; ‘trysexual – I’ll try 
anything sexual’; ‘unique’; ‘wish to try other sex’; ‘women alluring, men re-assuring’  
(Weatherburn et al., 2004: 6)    
 
To my knowledge, Weatherburn et al. (2004) have not published their work in an 
APA journal or subjected it to that organization’s norms.  I think that this is a very 
good thing, for in telling us more about these men’s descriptions of themselves than 
the APA would advise, some horizons of quantitative research remain visible in this 
report.  When I read this list of terms some of them made me laugh because they 
seemed to subvert the question that the researchers asked.  Others made me feel 
uncomfortable as they are terms I once used to describe myself but have long since 
given up.  Collectively, they made me wonder when and where sincerity, irony, 
cooperation and dissent might be the intended effects of nominating the sexual self 
with a particular label.  I was thrown back on the conclusion that it would be 
impossible to now know which motives lay behind the writing of particular terms.   
 
In other words, by telling their readers more than the APA might proscribe, 
Weatherburn et al. (2004) also provided us with the text we need to recognize our 
ignorance about what ‘people who are not heterosexual’ are thinking when they give 
of their time, effort, and privacy to research.  Nominations of one’s identity, even 
those that appear on factual social science questionnaires, are never simply 
accounts of pre-existing identities; rather those identities are called into being 
through the act of naming itself.  Such an identification is, in Butler’s terms, ‘a 
production, usually in response to a request.’ ‘Experimental’ and ‘free-spirited’ may 
be obviously produced accounts of identity, but their reprinting here shows how  the 
more quotidian ‘gay’ and ‘bisexual’ are productions also; sex with men, or with men 
and women is no guarantee that a man will identify as ‘gay’ or ‘bisexual.’ 
 
Finally, this list shows the impossibility of both the liberal humanist fantasy of 
celebrating the diversity of queer identities and the empiricist fantasy to sample those 
identities representatively.  With categories like ‘free-spirited,’ ‘batty boy,’ and ‘raving 
old poof’ at play, the notion that we will one day add enough categories to ‘lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, questioning….’  to saturate the possibility or 
representing identity categories seems to be about as far off as the positivist fantasy 
of representing each category with a recognizable representative sample.  Given that 
this study examines sex between men, which can be put to work as both ‘normalizing 
categories of oppressive structures’ and ‘rallying points for a liberatory contestation of 
that very oppression,’ the visible signs of these failures which limits our confidence in 
psychological knowledge may be a very good thing. 
 
EXPERIMENTS WITH NORMATIVITY 
Given these discursive limits of quantitative research, why would someone conduct 
social psychology experiments at all?  My own work in this field exemplifies how the 
experimental study of situationism has changed since Milgram’s time.  Social 
psychologists are less regularly concerned with such big and dramatic 
demonstrations of the power of immediate situations as those constructed by 
Milgram or Zimbardo.  In recent decades, as a result of ethical concerns raised by 
such experiments, and under the influence of cognitive psychology, we have become 
far more engaged with questions about how people make sense of their social worlds 
through attributions, stereotypes, and cognitive heuristics (see e.g., Fiske & 
Taylor,1991).   
 
As part of this shift, experimentalists have often examined how and why people 
rigidly cling to beliefs in the face of evidence to the contrary.  For example, in an early 
experiment Chapman and Chapman (1967) examined clinicians who erroneously 
judged that responses stereotypically associated with homosexuality were more likely 
to be produced in response to Rorschach cards by gay men than by others.   Snyder 
and Uranowitz (1978) studied the ways that people selectively remembered events 
from a woman’s life that are consistent with lesbian stereotypes after they learn that 
she has come out as lesbian.  Deaux and Lewis (1984) showed that people were 
described as transgressing norms for gender were more likely to be judged to be gay 
or lesbian than heterosexual. 
 
In other words, social psychology experiments have become ways of calling attention 
to the irrationality of modern life, and the impossibility of creating a social world in 
which people don’t automatically reach concensus about what evidence means.  
Allport’s (1954) positivist dream has been lost.  My own experiments concern the 
ways that people make sense of evidence about group differences by thinking 
normatively.  The first experiments I carried out in this domain were concerned with 
the ways that heteronormativity affects the way that people explain differences 
between people categorized by sexual orientation.  Felicia Pratto and I asked 
undergraduates to write explanations of scientific findings that we presented to them 
(see Hegarty & Pratto, 2001, 2004).  We told half of them that interview studies had 
shown that gay men and lesbians reported more gender non-conforming childhoods 
than heterosexual women and men.  The other half were told that the heterosexuals 
recalled more gender non-conforming childhoods.   The participants’ written 
explanations were coded for references to members of each sexual orientation 
group.  Participants overwhelmingly focused their explanations on behaviours, traits, 
and other attributes of lesbians and gay men, but mentioned far fewer particularities 
of heterosexuals that might have contributed to the group differences.    Similar 
findings have been observed when people explain other kinds of group differences; 
gender differences are explained by describing how women are different from men 
rather than how men are different from women (Hegarty & Buechel, 2006; Miller, 
Taylor, & Buck, 1991).   In the US, race differences are explained by taking Whites’ 
behaviour as the norm and explaining how Blacks’ behaviour differ from it (Pratto, 
Hegarty, & Korchmaros, in press).   
 
I will leave it to the reader to adjudicate whether this work is queer or not, but I have 
explained elsewhere how the experiments’ design was informed by queer theory and 
a desire to theorize human cognition in a way that could easily account for the ways 
that people think about group identities with non-essentialized categories (Barker & 
Hegarty, 2005).   The experiments were also conducted a propos of the resurgence 
of interest in gender-inversion models of homosexual development in psychology 
(e.g., Bailey & Zucker, 1995; Bem, 1995). We aimed to demonstrate that people 
make sense of such findings in culturally particular but systematic ways.  
Explanations of group differences involve drawing on existing knowledge about those 
groups; they require the citation of stereotypes, and as such are occasioned 
performances rather than literal truths.   However, scientists explanations are readily 
confused with facts, and when such explanations are heteronormative they become a 
site where heteronormativity is sedimented. 
 
We were particularly concerned with heteronormativity  in this research, and, 
following Butler (1993) understood research on gender-inversion models in 
psychology to normalize heterosexuality in at least three ways.  First, heterosexuals 
were taken as the norm for comparison, such that their particular attributes remained 
unspoken while those of lesbians and gay men incited psychological explanation.  
Second, the genders that are understood to be ‘inverted’ in this model are assumed 
to be heterosexuals’ genders.  The possibility that gay and lesbian genders might be 
the ontological basis for describing heterosexual genders beyond the epistemological 
horizon of gender inversion theories, even though heterosexual genders might be 
most obviously performed through the disavowal of homosexuality.  Third, in our 
experiments, the evidence supporting gender-inversion models was granted greater 
weight by the participants.  These findings were essentialized and deemed to be 
reports of real childhood differences.   In contrast, when we told participants that 
heterosexuals reported gender non-conforming experiences, they assumed that this 
mean that gay men and lesbians had lied to the interviewers or remembered their 
own childhoods wrongly.   
 
I think that these experiments not only say something about the stereotypes of the 
student participants, but also trouble the methods of professional social scientists as 
well.  Typically social cognition research assumes scientists to be more rational than 
laypeople, and describing the cognitions of the latter group as error-prone, naïve, 
biased or intuitive versions of the former (e.g., Kahneman, Slovic & Tverksy, 1982).  
However, this is a norm my colleagues and I are keen to publicly break.  So far we 
have three methods for so doing.  First, we study scientists’ explanations of group 
differences in their published texts as well as conducting experiments on 
undergraduates.   Thus far, we have found that psychologists and biologists accounts 
of sexual orientation differences are routinely heteronormative (e.g., Hegarty, 2003; 
Hegarty & Pratto, 2001) and their accounts of gender differences are routinely 
androcentric (Hegarty & Buechel, in press).   
 
Second, we try to model what opposition to normativity would look like in the way that 
we describe our own results.  In our experiments people write sentences that 
compared gay people to straight people more than the reverse, and preferred ‘more 
than’ constructions of difference to ‘less than’ constructions.  In contrast, we pepper 
our results sections with sentences such as this one;  
 
Across the experiment as a whole, fewer references to straight men (M =0.49) than 
to gay men (M = 0.78) were produced, F (1, 122) = 6.20, p <.05 (Hegarty & Pratto, 
2001, p. 727). 
   
Some readers have told us that when they read our experimental findings, their tacit 
knowledge about norms for explanations of group differences becomes engaged by 
our writing practice.  Like Lorde (1984), we understand such ‘mythical norms’ as 
whiteness, Christianity, heterosexuality, etc. to inhabit the edge of consciousness; we 
can bring them into view but we habitually do not, and the consequence of our 
habitual non-conscious thinking about norms is a set of scientific representations of 
group identity that conflate certain groups with the norm.    
 
Third, we openly describe ourselves as scientists situated within culture, whose 
thinking is shaped by the tacit knowledge we describe (see e.g., Hegarty & Pratto, 
2004, p. 452).  Thus, we work against the image of laypeople as biased version of 
scientific rationality, concluding instead that “psychologists are very ordinary, very 
much influenced by culture, and very much like other people” (Hegarty & Buechel, in 
press).  
 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have argued that queering methodologies in psychology involves 
memory work, epistemological bravado, and literary subversion that cares enough 
about the ritualized practices of ‘methodology’ to blaspheme against them.  The 
equation of critical work with qualitative work on psychology has opened up many 
new ways of producing knowledge about queerness, many of which are described in 
other chapters in this book.  However, queer theory could be quantophilic as well as 
quantophobic.  There is much to play for in laboratories, even if the pleasures of 
playing in that space have been largely claimed by straight men (Lubek  & Stam, 
1995).  Access to experimental spaces where ‘the social’ is materialized through 
practices of artifice, performance, and social roles has presented - and continues to 
present - difficulties for queers, who were deliberately excluded at its foundational 
moments.   All the more reason why this is a space to which we might lay claim.    
 
Endnotes 
1.  The “GI Bill” or 1944 Serviceman’s readjustment act provided college and 
vocational education for returning World War II veterans in addition to unemployment 
benefits and housing loans.  
2.  The “DSM” of ‘Diagnostic and Statistical Manual is the codification of psychiatric 
disorders institutionalized by the American Psychiatric Association. Both the first 
DSM (published in 1952) and DSM II (published in 1968) listed homosexuality as a 
mental illness.  Subsequent to the Association’s vote to remove homosexuality in 
1973, DSM III (published in 1980) listed only ‘ego-dystonic homosexuality’ to refer to 
gay and lesbian persons who themselves perceived their homosexuality to be an 
impediment to psychological adjustment.  This category was removed from the 
Revision to DSM III (published in 1987).   
3.  In Zimbardo’s experiment, male college student volunteers were randomly 
assigned to play the roles of ‘prisoner’ and ‘guard’ in a mock prison in the basement 
of Stanford’s Psychology Department. Although the experiment was scheduled to run 
for two weeks, it was stopped after six days for ethical reasons.  Accounts of this 
experiment attributed the guards’ brutal behaviour and the prisoners’ acquiescence 
to their roles in terms of the ‘power of the situation’ over the personality of the 
individual.  While Zimbardo (1999) also reproduces this narrative, it also shows 
clearly that the prisoners often rebelled individually and collectively and that the 
guards’ brutality was supported by Zimbardo’s own dual role as ‘experimenter’ 
(outside the experiment) and chief prison guard (within it).  My point here is that SM, 
at least as described by Townsend (2000) – who was exiting a career in psychology 
around the same time that Zimbardo’s experiment was garnering him fame within the 
discipline – had lessons for the ethical means of managing consent in situations 
where role-play and power are concerned; lessons which, many within the discipline 
of social psychology were resistant to learning. 
4.  In 1994 SIGMA research evolved from Project SIGMA which had conducted 
longitudinal research on the health of gay and bisexual men in the UK since 1987.  
SIGMA Research is “a social research group specialising in the behavioural and 
policy aspects of HIV and sexual health” 
(http://www.sigmaresearch.org.uk/index.html).    
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